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Introduction1 
 
The Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (‘SFAP’) has been seen, since 
its adoption in 2012, as a ground-breaking document, and as a welcome commitment of the EU and its 
Member States towards delivering on the EU’s pledge to promote human rights and democracy 
throughout their external relations policies. 
Whereas the Strategic Framework is considered a foundational and permanent statement of the EU in 
this regard, the first version of the Action Plan has expired at the end of 2014. According to the EEAS, the 
results have been outstanding with about 90% of actions completed by the end of 2014. Therefore, a 
consensus was formed to issue a second instalment of the action plan. 
This policy brief seeks to contribute to the design of this new Action Plan and identifies six items which 
should be addressed and improved on the occasion of the review of the Action Plan. For each item, the 
background issues to be taken into consideration are first laid out, then the objectives to be achieved 
through each item are spelled out, and finally concrete actions are suggested. 
The six items are: 
1. Avoid fragmentation between human rights, democratization and rule of law policies 
2. Verifiable actions and use of indicators 
3. Communicating on policy and reporting on progress 
4. Engaging with EU Member States  
5. Cooperation with third countries 
6. Reduce the disconnect of the SFAP with economic, social and cultural rights  
  
                                                          
1 Authored by Anna-Luise Chané, Nicolas Hachez, Brecht Lein, Dr. Karolina Podstawa and Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters. The 
authors are members of the FRAME project, a large-scale, collaborative research project funded under the EU 
Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7, Grant Agreement No. 320000), coordinated by the Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies and conducted by 19 research institutes from around the world. Our research 
focuses on the contribution of the EU’s internal and external policies to the promotion of human rights worldwide. 
FRAME Policy Brief  Post-2014 Action Plan 
4 
 
I. Avoid fragmentation between human rights, democratization and 
rule of law policies 
 
Human rights, democracy and rule of law form the core of the EU’s ‘values’ underpinning all of its policies 
as per Art. 2 TEU. They are to be ‘promoted and upheld’ according to Article 3(5) TEU in the EU’s relations 
with the wider world. In line with Article 21(1) TEU they belong to the set of principles that inspired the 
EU’s creation and therefore guide the Union’s action on the international scene. The three values are 
often dubbed the ‘constitutional trinity’ in the set of EU norms, and are viewed as interdependent and 
inseparable.  
Indeed, not only have philosophical and academic debates evidenced the conceptual links that exist 
between these different values, but the EU itself has endorsed the inter-linkages between them.2 Relying 
on basic definitions of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, examples of such links are: 
• The enjoyment of human rights cannot be ensured without a strong rule of law which notably 
allows for rights to be litigated; 
• The rule of law is not possible outside a healthy democratic political process which ensures that 
the law is not arbitrary and/or oppressive towards anyone; and 
• Democracy is only realised when it is exercised in full respect of human rights and the rule of law. 
A majoritarian rule, which would weaken human rights and the rule of law, is oppression in 
disguise. 
Therefore, observers have noted the fragmentation and absence of mutual reinforcement that exists 
between the different policies seeking to foster those values.  
The 2012 SFAP is, in this respect, a bit puzzling as its title and content refers to the promotion of human 
rights and democracy, but not the rule of law, even though lip service is paid to the latter in the Strategic 
Framework.  
In addition, many observers have remarked that the human rights component of the SFAP was quite 
heavily tilted towards human rights, with the democracy component receiving far less attention.  
Illustratively, the Strategic Framework, in the ‘Pursuing coherent objectives’, states:  
Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union has reaffirmed the EU’s determination to promote 
human rights and democracy through all its external actions. The entry into legal force of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the prospect of the EU’s acceptance of the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights through its accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, underline the EU’s commitment to human rights in all spheres.  
 
                                                          
2 Alexandra Timmer et al., ‘Report state-of-the-art literature review human rights, democracy and the rule of law’, 
FRAME Deliverable No. 3.1, November 2013, available at http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-
content/materiale/reports/01-Deliverable-3.1.pdf.  
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And 
The EU seeks to prevent violations of human rights throughout the world and, where violations 
occur, to ensure that victims have access to justice and redress and that those responsible are 
held to account. To this end, the EU will step up its efforts to promote human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law across all aspects of external action. 
Seen like this, it seems that the three values are randomly cited, and do not appear to be conceived in a 
mutually reinforcing manner as part of a coherence policy on value promotion. 
Therefore, not only is there a risk for gaps or overlap between actions taken in respect of each of those 
values separately, but the impression is also that some values have a higher profile than others.  
 
A. Objectives 
  
The general objective of this action is to rebalance the focus of the SFAP on all three values, and to seek 
links and synergies between them, in order to do justice to their interdependence in concrete actions. 
This is technically possible in the Action Plan since the Strategic Framework mentions human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law. In the long term, this will also allow for a better conceptualization of the 
three values in the context of the alignment of internal and external policies. The foundations of this 
enterprise have notably been laid out in the European Commission’s Communication on A New EU 
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law COM (2014) 158 final, and in a number of other background 
documents.3 In our opinion, the SFAP also has the potential to contribute to this reflection. 
Focusing on the central role of human rights in the trinity, the following image could be used as a means 
of visually demonstrating the linkage:  
 
                                                          
3 See e.g. Sergio Carrera et al ‘The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law 
in the EU - Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism’, Study for the European Parliament, 2013, PE 493.031. 
Human Rights
DemocracyRule of Law
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In the three overlapping circles, human rights is the biggest one to illustrate that it shares the largest 
number of principles with the other two values. Importantly, the larger presence of human rights indicates 
the conceptual choices of the EU – that of the thick conception of the rule of law as indicated by the 
aforementioned 2014 Communication of the Commission, and that of representative democracy (cf. 
Article 10(1) TEU) with rule of law and human rights safeguards endorsed by the Union.  
The EU’s specific objectives in this regard are: 
1. To arrive at a more coherent and credible definition of its policy for its cardinal values; and 
2. To seek better promotion of each value through the promotion of the other values, by exploiting 
the links and synergies between them. 
  
B. Suggested adaptations 
  
1. Include a general item in the Action Plan which would contain actions to foster the rule of law in 
third countries. 
Such actions would be directed at: 
• Increasing the formal quality of laws to ensure that they are clear, stable, general and 
understandable by all, so that everyone knows what their rights and obligations are and can 
plan their actions in consideration of those; 
• Raising awareness about the law, the legal system, rights and obligations in the population, 
so as to make everyone aware that they live in a society governed by law which entitles them 
to some rights and places certain obligations upon them; 
• Encouraging the creation of a well-educated, well-performing and affordable legal profession 
effectively able to defend the rights of citizens; 
• Contributing to the enhancement of the (democratic) accountability of executive powers in 
third countries by supporting their parliaments, but also by engaging with public officials, 
notably for combating corruption; and 
• Fostering the creation of independent judiciaries ensuring that disputes regarding rights and 
obligations, but also the judicial review of laws, are ensured in a timely manner and with due 
process. To some extent, this aspect is already present in action 26 (Administration of justice) 
and 27 (Responding to violations: ensuring accountability). 
 
2. Reconsider a number of existing actions to ensure that, where implemented, they also have a 
positive effect on the rule of law (and democracy where it is currently absent). This would help 
operationalise the mutually reinforcing character of the different values. For many such actions 
this could be quite straightforward.  
Examples include: 
• Action 1, ‘incorporate human rights in all impact assessments’, could include democracy and 
the rule of law, provided appropriate indicators can be found; 
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• Action 13, ‘Entrench human rights in counter-terrorism activities’, also lends itself to rule of 
law actions, making sure that counter-terrorist legislations are transparent and judicially 
reviewable, but also that alleged terrorists benefit from a fair trial; and 
• Action 31, ‘Impact on the ground through tailor-made approaches’, is amenable to actions 
regarding the rule of law and democracy, as each of the bilateral partners has different needs 
in this respect. 
 
 
II. Verifiable actions and use of indicators 
 
The Action Plan was welcomed as a very useful roadmap for ensuring that the EU’s pledge to promote 
human rights as part of its external action had a well-defined sense of direction. 
Yet, many such actions were drafted in vague terms, and the internal document recording progress 
and/or achievement of these actions in terms of percentages, sounded at various instances a little hollow.  
For example, when action 4 (a), ‘Intensify the promotion of ratification and effective implementation of 
key international human rights treaties, including regional human rights instruments’, is marked as 
‘achieved’, one wonders what exactly was done, what kind of results were achieved, and what difference 
was really made. Was it simply exhortations to third countries to ratify more conventions, or were more 
effective means leveraged, leading to concrete results, such as a demonstrable increase in ratification 
numbers? Furthermore, beyond ratification, what kind of actions to foster effective implementation were 
put in place, and how were results measured? 
The question of measuring the results of human rights promotion is particularly relevant in the EU context, 
as the Treaties impose on the EU an obligation to ‘promote and uphold’ human rights (see supra, I). The 
fulfilment of this obligation, which Member States placed on the EU, also needs to be measured as a 
matter of democratic accountability of the EU itself. In this regard, the success of every action of the 
Action Plan also needs to be quantified. 
With regard to the above, indicators are most likely instrumental in the success of an action plan-type 
of policy. Since human rights are expressed in terms of legal standards, and since the actions of the Action 
Plan are designed as steps towards achieving those standards, indicators are a powerful tool to measure, 
at regular intervals, the level of achievement of such standards. Indicators would also facilitate the 
continued search for coherent policies, as cross-effects between different actions could more readily be 
diagnosed. 
Unfortunately, indicators suffer from many imperfections between methodological intricacies (such as 
the joint examination of quantitative and qualitative data), and with their absence in certain fields or their 
proliferation in others, it is not easy to find a reliable standard against which each action can be 
benchmarked.  
Therefore, promoting human rights may also mean working towards the identification and development 
of appropriate human rights indicators. 
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A. Objective 
  
The objective of the future Action Plan should be to bolster the credibility of the EU’s action in the 
promotion of its values through the definition of actions which are verifiable in terms of results. 
 
B. Suggested adaptations 
 
Suggestions to increase the credibility of EU action, notably through the use of indicators, include the 
following: 
1. Avoid vague objectives which could dilute the ‘action’-oriented character of the plan into 
generalities. When broad objectives are stated (for example the above-cited action 4 (a)), they 
should be broken down into concrete implementing actions; 
2. When possible and/or available, benchmark actions against an indicator so as to allow for 
effective measurement of progress, and demonstrate causality between EU action and such 
progress. EU bodies and institutions have already been using indicators in a number of contexts. 
The Action Plan should capitalise on this and mention the use of indicators when actions connect 
or build on such practices. This is particularly relevant for the development field and for the 
elaboration of a rights-based approach to human rights (Action 10); 
3. In case indicators are not readily available, work on a coherent approach to human rights 
indicators and rationalise the efforts that several EU bodies or institutions have already made to 
develop indicators. Relevant third countries should be engaged and cooperated with for this 
purpose, and their capacity to contribute to data collection should be taken into account. This 
should be the purpose of an Action as such; and 
4. In the development of new indicators, adopt the OHCHR ‘structure-process-outcome’ 
framework,4 which is designed to measure the extent to which human rights standards are 
respected, protected, fulfilled and promoted in any given environment. 
  
 
III. Cooperation with third countries 
 
Cooperation between the EU and third countries on human rights issues is often challenging. In the EU’s 
experience, third countries not only frequently lack interest to engage in a constructive dialogue with the 
EU, but also appear to disagree with the EU on principle, independent of the subject matter at hand. These 
widespread perceptions at the EU policy level are supported by scholarly studies to the extent that the EU 
faces difficulties to build coalitions and to shape the agenda of multilateral human rights bodies. 
There are three main reasons which can be identified as being at the root of these challenges: 
1. Credibility: The EU is often externally perceived to lack credibility as a human rights champion. 
Third country representatives particularly point to the EU’s alleged lack of internal-external and 
external-external consistency. The first refers to discrepancies between the EU’s internal 
                                                          
4 See United Nations, ‘Report on indicators for promoting and monitoring the implementation of human rights’, 6 
June 2008, UN Doc No. HRI/MC/2008/3. 
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application of policies that it promotes externally. Critics particularly address the treatment of the 
Roma, racism and xenophobia issues within the EU’s borders, the lack of concern and respect for 
economic and social rights – particularly in times of economic crisis – and the involvement of 
several EU Member States in human rights-violating anti-terror practices with the United States 
as part of the so-called ‘war on terror’. External-external consistency ‘refers to the degree of 
uniformity in which the EU promotes human rights externally, both with regard to individual 
human rights issues and with regard to individual third country partners. It has, for example, been 
criticised that the EU places a stronger focus on the promotion of civil and political rights, to the 
detriment of economic, social and cultural rights (see infra). It has also been noted that the EU is 
quicker to address human rights violations in economically weak and politically isolated countries, 
while being less vocal about comparable incidents in allied or partner countries’;5 
2. Process: The EU’s unique nature as a supranational organization composed of 28 Member States 
necessitates a sophisticated internal coordination process in order to ensure policy coherence 
and a unified external voice. Although considerable progress has been made in recent years to 
increase the efficiency of this coordination process, the Union’s resources in terms of time and 
personnel are still bound up to a high degree in purely internal discussions, thus leaving 
insufficient capacities for external outreach, lobbying and coalition building; and 
3. Substance: Many third countries, in particular in the Global South, place stronger emphasis on 
economic, social and cultural rights (‘ESC rights’), than on civil and political rights. The EU on the 
other hand focuses primarily on thematic initiatives in the area of civil and political rights. This is 
exemplified by the fact that the EU itself does not table resolutions on ESC rights in multilateral 
fora, and that its statements delivered at the multilateral level address primarily civil and political 
rights. On the other hand, the EU lists among its thematic priorities human rights issues that are 
controversial, or at least, of less significance for many third countries, such as, for example, LGBTI 
rights. There is thus a disconnection between the issues that are high on the EU’s agenda and 
those that many third countries consider most important. 
 
A. Objectives 
 
The new Action Plan should address these challenges by identifying concrete steps to be taken in order to 
mitigate the EU’s challenges in this respect. The EU’s objectives should be: 
1. To mitigate its consistency gaps in order to be perceived as a credible human rights authority by 
third country partners; 
2. To further enhance its coordination process in Brussels and on the ground with local actors in 
order to free more capacities for increased dialogue with third country partners; and 
3. To place ESC rights higher on its agenda and to use them as an entry point for third country 
dialogues. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
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B. Suggested adaptations 
 
Potential concrete actions include: 
1. Further intensify the cooperation between FREMP and COHOM by increasing the number of joint 
meetings per year from two to at least one per quarter and by specifying concrete outputs that 
the committees should jointly produce. These should include a periodic coherence report which 
analyses the internal-external consistency of the EU’s human rights policy and identifies gaps that 
require action. The meetings should in particular also be used to discuss criticism on the internal 
human rights record that are levelled against the EU by third countries; 
2. Regularly involve NGOs and CSOs that work on fundamental rights issues within the EU in 
meetings of FREMP and COHOM, and actively engage them in the debate on the internal-external 
consistency of the EU’s human rights policy; 
3. Adopt a Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Fundamental Rights based on the design of the 
SFAP and the Stockholm Programme and Action Plan. The development of the Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan should tie in with the ongoing discussions on a successor instrument 
for the Stockholm Programme; 
4. Create and maintain a database on the status of ratification of international human rights 
instruments by the EU and the EU Member States; 
5. Further strengthen the existing system of burden sharing (thereby preserving mutual trust 
amongst the Member States) by developing a strategy that identifies individual EU Member States 
as burden sharers for particular issues, based on their thematic or geographic involvement and 
expertise, as well as on their diplomatic networks; 
6. Develop and table an EU resolution initiative on an ESC rights issue at the UN Human Rights 
Council, as a prominent ‘flagship’ initiative, highlighting the Union’s commitment to ESC rights. 
National resolution initiatives of the EU Member States might be suitable candidates; 
7. Accord ESC rights a more prominent position in EU statements at multilateral human rights fora; 
8. Put ESC rights higher on the agenda in human rights dialogues with third countries; and 
9. Use political and human rights dialogues as a genuine forum for bilateral exchange and avoid the 
perception of ‘lecturing’ the partner country. Identify human rights issues that are of particular 
interest for the partner country and place them high on the agenda. 
 
 
IV. Communicating on policy choices and reporting on progress 
 
A further item for consideration is the question of how the Action Plan contributes to the transparency of 
human rights policies and the accountability of the EU institutions in relation to the wider public. The 
Action Plan is, as indicated, a welcome development in that it provides a roadmap for current action, but 
transparency and accountability need to occur all along the policy cycle. In this regard, providing 
information on what will be done and why (priority setting); what has been done and how it was evaluated 
(reporting); and which actions will follow (planning), is currently done on an ad hoc basis and/or through 
the channel of the Brussels human rights NGOs. Meaningful interactions also take place with the European 
Parliament (most notably the DROI Sub-Committee), but direct communication to the public appears to 
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be a somewhat less developed aspect of the EU external human rights policy. Therefore, to buttress the 
transparency and accountability of the policy-making process leading to the Action Plan, next to involving 
the European Parliament, we would recommend to devise an effective communication strategy for the 
benefit of the wider public. So far, the access of citizens to information on the EU external human rights 
policies is limited. This is due to a number of factors – some of which cannot be overcome (i. e. the need 
to maintain the confidentiality of individual third country strategies), whilst others, however, can be 
addressed.  
 
With regard to reporting on progress, under Action 3 of the 2012 Action Plan, the EEAS was obliged to 
‘present the EU’s performance in meeting the objectives of its human rights strategy in the annual report 
on human rights and democracy in the world’. While the annual report is a suitable way to publicly 
monitor the implementation of the Action Plan, additional reporting obligations should be considered. In 
particular, it might be helpful to increase the frequency of reports from 1 year to 6 months, in order to 
allow for a more timely adaptation of the implementation strategy, including the increase or re-direction 
of efforts. Particularly given the comparatively short 2 year life-span of the Action Plan, a single 
intermediary report might not be sufficient. Additionally, the format of the Annual Report entails that only 
those actions on which progress has been made will be mentioned, whilst those on which no action has 
been taken so far, will be left out. This might create blind spots and direct the focus away from those 
issues on which most effort is required. Lastly, the publicity of the Annual Report might be detrimental to 
a frank and open stock taking and provide incentives to only refer to those actions which were successfully 
implemented. An additional, confidential progress report might therefore be beneficial for an assessment 
of the state of play. 
 
A. Objectives 
  
The objectives of enhanced communication and reporting are:  
1. To ensure maximal transparency ex ante at the stage of policy-making, most notably for what 
regards the selection of thematic priorities, as those currently present in the 2012 Action Plan 
have been the object of critique both within and outside the EU (see notably the absence of ESC 
rights in the priorities); 
2. To increase transparency ex post when evaluating achievements and failures. By the same token, 
more targeted reporting would generate debate and input for better policies; and 
3. To present this information in a comprehensive and accessible manner, so as to facilitate the 
attribution of accountability to the EU’s actions. 
 
B. Suggested adaptations 
 
It appears, therefore, essential to maintain Action 3 ‘Present EU performance in meeting the objectives 
of its human rights strategy in the annual report on human rights and democracy in the world’, but also 
to provide for additional steps: 
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1. Devise communication campaigns and tools regarding human rights (but also democracy and rule 
of law) policy making, notably through an integrated website concerning the EU promotion of its 
values, and provide a forum for exchange with the wider public on priorities in this regard, to 
contribute in the definition of future Action Plans; 
2. Draft a reporting form which covers all individual actions of the Action Plan. For each action, the 
institution(s)/actor(s) responsible for implementation should be identified. They should be 
provided with the opportunity to rate the level of implementation of the action on a pre-
determined scale using indicators (as recommended above) and give a summary of actions 
undertaken so far and of the actions planned for the remainder of the duration of the Action Plan. 
Furthermore, they should be provided with the possibility to make comments and suggestions on 
the implementation of actions, which are outside the scope of their responsibility; 
3. Establish a six month reporting schedule in which the form is filled by the EU and Member State 
institutions responsible for the implementation of the individual actions; 
4. Circulate the consolidated document amongst all relevant EU and Member State institutions; 
5. Provide a forum for exchange on the results of the progress reporting. The exchange should allow 
for an open discussion and exchange of best practices and information; and 
6. Conduct a final, public evaluation of the Action Plan after its expiration, involving EU and Member 
States institutions, as well as NGOs, CSOs, and academia. 
 
 
V. Engaging with EU Member States6 
 
Promoting and speaking out on human rights and democracy is a joint responsibility of the EU and its 
Member States. Adopted at Council level, both the Strategic Framework and the corresponding EU Action 
Plan on Human Rights and Democracy consolidate this joint commitment to advance human rights 
worldwide. The implementation of an EU human rights policy framework, as is to be achieved through the 
formulation of the new Action Plan early 2015, is therefore based on the principle of burden sharing and 
the 3Cs approach: coherence, complementarity and coordination. Yet, while EU Member States broadly 
agree on the importance of promoting human rights in a normative way, there is often less consensus on 
how to achieve this in practice and what it implies in a certain context. The often sensitive and highly 
political nature of human rights, as well as the complex mix of Member States and EU foreign interests at 
play, further necessitates a close and systematic interaction between the EU and its Member States at 
various levels of engagement. 
 
Despite significant promising improvements such as the new role of EU Delegations and the 2012 Strategic 
Framework as the basis for a joint EU/Member States human rights agenda, there is still a noticeable lack 
of consistent political backing for a coherent translation of this joint agenda at country level, particularly 
in countries where human rights are most at risk. Well-coordinated and clear mandates from both 
Member States’ capitals and Brussels should mitigate the risk of the EU being (perceived as) left acting 
on its own, particularly at the level of EU Delegations, often while Member States pursue their own 
                                                          
6 Disclaimer: given the confidential nature of local EU HR strategies, some of the observations and recommendations 
outlined in this section may already be common practice, though simply not known to the broader public. 
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specific and sometimes competing foreign interests, raising challenges of coherence. Relying on Member 
States for certain issues would also be a way for the EU to stay engaged on those issues even where 
delivery by itself is not possible for certain reasons.  
The above observations are particularly relevant in formal and informal political dialogues between the 
EU and partner countries, when Member State support is ambiguous and/or partner countries receive 
mixed signals, hampering EU leverage in its human rights efforts. Experience shows that, when EU 
positioning and action go beyond (or cross) Member States’ individual interests or political capital, this 
often results in a dilution of the human rights agenda, in turn leading to the watering down of EU action 
to the lowest common denominator. Such practice leads to inconsistencies and ‘double standards’ and 
affects overall EU credibility as a ‘norm entrepreneur’.7 In a similar vein, budgetary discussions on aid 
allocation to partner countries with a questionable human rights track record can lead to an outspoken 
split in Member States/EU positioning. Such so-called development vs. human rights debates on whether 
to cut or limit disbursements usually involve normative (human rights) arguments and strategic EU- or 
Member States-specific interests. The discussions between Northern and Southern Member States on 
whether or not to block millions of EU aid to the Gambia are an example hereof. 
In terms of ensuring coordination and complementarity at country level, EU Delegations should i) chair 
the above-mentioned political dialogue between the EU/Member States and the partner countries 
(particularly, but not exclusively with ACP states); and ii) facilitate various regular or irregular working 
groups. Such structures mainly serve as information sharing fora on ‘who does what’, but can often 
provide the opportunity to ensure complementarity, discuss a division of labour, avoid overlapping or 
duplication of EU and Member States initiatives and generate greater leverage, including providing 
support to ‘home-grown’ human rights initiatives or human rights defenders working on sensitive issues. 
There remains, however, much scope for a more consistent and comprehensive approach, at both 
headquarters and EU Delegation level to allow for a more complimentary organisation of EU/Member 
States support to human rights promotion.  
 
A. Objectives 
 
In the previous Action Plan, which ended in December 2014, there was a lack of clear indications of the 
tasks and responsibilities for Member States in implementing the EU human rights agenda. Therefore, any 
future Action Plan should aim to work toward the following objectives: 
1. Ensure clear and consistent political backing to better align EU and Member States’ human rights 
agendas at country level; and 
2. Elaborate and institutionalise coordination systems, both at headquarters and at country level.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Bossuyt, J., Lein, B., Rocca, C. 2014. Political dialogue on Human Rights under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement: 
study for the European Parliament Development Committee. Brussels: European Parliament.  
FRAME Policy Brief  Post-2014 Action Plan 
14 
 
B. Suggested adaptations 
 
The following suggestions for concrete actions should be considered in order to generate closer and 
mutually reinforcing EU-Member States cooperation on human rights promotion in third countries:  
1. Ensure closer, formal involvement of EU Member States’ embassies in country-level human rights 
analysis to identify specific human rights needs and windows of opportunity. Build on such joint 
assessments to develop a common local EU human rights Strategy, including a division of labour. 
Where possible, and perhaps in parallel with – or integrated in – joint programming exercises, 
translate such a joint agenda in a common programming document. Such joint endeavours should 
be backed up and incentivised by clear and consistent political support from Brussels and the 
Member States’ capitals; 
2. Communicate more transparently on EU and Member States’ interests, both internally and vis-à-
vis third countries. Both the EU and its Member States tend to be rather ambiguous when it comes 
to formulating their strategic foreign interests – this is in stark contrast to their ambitious 
commitments to human rights promotion. More openness would provide more clarity on the 
areas for, and the limitations of, EU-Member State cooperation, and would help manage 
expectations among local civil society constituencies regarding the EU’s overall agenda; and 
3. Closely involve EU Member States in the formulation of the new Action Plan and jointly develop 
an improved monitoring system which allows tracking of Member States’ progress in their 
contribution to the overall ambitions of the Strategic Framework. First, the new AP should outline 
explicitly which goals require what type of Member State collaboration. Secondly, a more detailed 
log frame should specify the involvement of particular Member States, potentially identifying 
which particular Member State should (voluntarily) lead and report on certain human rights 
topics. Other ways to increase Member State accountability with regard to the Action Plan could 
include Member State-specific ‘boxes’ in the annual thematic report and their examples of 
innovative programmes and successful (or unsuccessful) Member States-EU joint initiatives. 
 
 
VI. Reduce the disconnect of the SFAP with Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
 
While the 2012 EU SFAP notes that the EU will intensify its efforts to promote and protect ESC rights, this 
aspect of the Strategy has been reflected rather poorly in the past Action Plan. Moreover, several studies 
of the EU’s human rights efforts have pointed out that, in implementing the human rights dimensions of 
some of its external policies, such as development and trade,8 the EU sometimes tends to be too 
(exclusively) focused on ‘traditional’ civil and political rights (e.g. fundamental freedoms and the abolition 
                                                          
8 For suggestions as to how to increase the profile of EU efforts towards ESCR promotion in other domains, see supra, 
III.  
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of the death penalty).9 For instance, there is limited attention for the rights-based dimensions of 
development cooperation which touch upon certain ESC rights.10  
 
The tendency to deal with human rights in isolation from the broader sphere of development 
cooperation and the associated policy, programming and financing toolbox is an old sore and stems from 
a range of historical and current factors, such as the interpretation that aid should be non-political, the 
limited collaboration across geographic and thematic (human rights) expert units in institutions, and the 
fear of development staff that too much of a human rights focus would distract attention from economic 
development, whereby human rights issues would complicate donor-recipient relations and therefore 
hamper the straightforward delivery of aid disbursements – particularly since aid-dependency and poor 
human rights track records often go hand in hand. 
 
While significant progress has been made in recent years, much remains to be done to mainstream 
human rights in development cooperation. The effective integration of human rights into policy 
formulation and implementation processes is crucial in this regard, as well as incorporating a sound 
human rights needs and opportunities analysis at programming level (e.g. in the Country Strategy Papers) 
and strengthening the linkages between human rights political dialogue and the relevant geographic and 
thematic instruments at play in the country. In this regard, the EU’s Agenda for Change offers a good point 
of departure, since it aims to enhance the importance of human rights, democracy and good governance 
in EU development cooperation, across a mix of instruments and aid modalities at country level.11 The 
renewed attention for a ‘rights-based approach’ in several areas (e.g. food, water, health), as well as the 
new budget support guidelines, particularly those related to the ‘Good Governance and Development 
Contracts’, offer promising opportunities to further align the human rights and development agendas. 
However, such initiatives remain somewhat ad hoc and depend to some extent, particularly at EU 
Delegation level, on committed individuals.  
When it comes to trade, the EU has a number of trade instruments at its disposal featuring innovative 
means to make their validity conditional to the partner’s human rights performance, either through 
conditionality in return for preferential access to the EU market or in the form of human rights clauses 
included in the EU’s bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Although exclusively applied to 
developing countries and emerging economies, and subjected to criticism regarding double standards and 
                                                          
9 The EIDHR’s programming objectives are telling in this regard, in the sense that they focus on the support to i) 
human rights defenders; ii) ‘other EU HR priorities’; iii) democracy; iv) election observations; and v) targeted key 
actors and processes, including international and regional human rights instruments and mechanisms. See European 
Commission, Management Plan 2014 Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, Ref. 
Ares(2014)208906 - 30/01/2014. 
10 Ibid., 30. See also Petrucci, F., Bossuyt, J., De Feyter, K., Foresti, M., Domingo, P., Monti, S., Thematic evaluation 
of the European Commission support to respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including solidarity 
with victims of repression), Final report, Vol. 1, December 2011. 
11 European Commission, ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change’ Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, 13 October 2011, COM(2011) 637 final.  
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norms versus interests dichotomy, many human rights provisions in EU trade instruments relate to ESC 
rights. For instance, the new generation of bilateral and regional trade agreements includes sustainable 
development chapters aimed specifically at addressing labour rights. However, the monitoring and 
enforcement of these provisions has been found to be flawed and has led to accusations of double 
standards and pusillanimity.  
Furthermore, observers have noted inter-institutional tendencies on human rights-related trade 
discussions. Whereas the Commission, and to a slightly lesser extent the Council, generally tends to favour 
the ‘carrot’, promoting human rights progress through incentives and capacity-building measures, and 
using sanctions as a means of last resort, the European Parliament and civil society organisations at large 
tend to  favour a more normative approach, using trade sanctions and the human rights clause in a clearer 
and more consistent way, thus favouring the ‘stick’.12 
 
A. Objectives 
 
In order to further institutionalise closer alignment between EU trade and development cooperation and 
ESC rights, the Action Plan should be fine-tuned toward the following objectives: 
1. Enhanced resources and incentives to further mainstream ESC rights promotion through 
development cooperation at all stages of the policy cycle. 
2. Enhanced monitoring and enforcement of ESC rights conditions through EU trade instruments. 
  
B. Suggested adaptations 
 
We suggest the following recommendations for action: 
1. In countries where Joint Programming has been introduced, look at the scope of human rights 
promotion in ESC sectorial programmes; 
2. Make ESC rights one of the strategic EU priorities (flagship priorities) in the new Action Plan and 
develop EU guidelines on ESC rights promotion and the protection of relevant communities;  
3. Include human rights monitoring in the sectorial and programme-level evaluations of 
development programming at country level; 
4. Ensure that the Development Cooperation and Trade and Investment sections in EU Delegations 
are adequately resourced, staffed, trained and incentivised to integrate human rights into their 
operations; 
5. Support experimenting and knowledge sharing on how to best mainstream human rights in 
development cooperation, while creating incentives at political, managerial and implementation 
level to promote mainstreaming more actively; 
6. Institutionalise the use of, and improve capacity to conduct, sound political economy analysis of 
the power dynamics and interests at play in order to fully understand the type of structural 
reforms required to address ECS rights issues at sectorial and/or country level; 
                                                          
12 Beke, L., D’Hollander, D., Hachez, N. and Pérez de las Heras, B. ‘Report on the integration of human rights in EU 
development and trade policies’. WP No.9 – Deliverable No.1 FRAME, 30 September 2014. http://www.fp7-
frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/reports/07-Deliverable-9.1.pdf 
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7. Incentivise knowledge sharing on best practices related to the use of the sustainable development 
chapters in free trade agreements; and 
8. Design a new approach to conditionality which is flexible enough to allow for an adapted, 
systematic and effective response to human rights (particularly ESC rights) violations without 
creating double standards. 
